Subjectivity from Abhidharma to Yogācāra

This paper analyzes theories on subjectivity and how they changed from Abhidharma scholasticism to Yogācāra philosophy of mind. One of the most common and fundamental themes in Buddhist intellectual discourses is the denial of self (anātman). Throughout history, Buddhist thinkers have attempted to account for subjectivity, while rejecting self as the basis for perhaps the most intrinsic and ineradicable feature of our existence. The Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntikas maintain the reductionist approach to self and explain our sense of self through the function of the mental factor, the view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi). However, under this Abhidharmic model subjectivity is at best episodic and sporadic. The Yogācāra thinkers then proposed the theory of the afflicted mentation (kliṣṭaṁ manas) which constantly ruminates and is responsible for the sense of self. This paper investigates the transition from the Abhidharma to the Yogācāra model and the intellectual context in which this transition emerged.