Abhidharma and Yogācāra

In the Buddhist path toward liberation, cognitive objects serve as a double-edged sword: on one hand, they prompt cognitive and emotional attachments that hinder sentient beings from attaining liberation; on the other hand, they are essential for guiding one toward the liberating knowledge that alone serves as the key to liberation. This paper draws from the Yogācāra theory of three natures (trisvabhāva-nirdeśa) outlined in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra to suggest that the key to resolving the above tension is the idea of pure dependent nature. When the dependent nature (i.e., cognitive objects) is detached from the imagined nature (i.e., concepts superimposed on cognitive objects), cognitive objects are perceived through non-conceptual perception. Only through non-conceptual perception of objects can further seeds of names and concepts be avoided in the storehouse consciousness. In essence, a proper mode of perceiving cognitive objects paves the way for their elimination.

This paper analyzes theories on subjectivity and how they changed from Abhidharma scholasticism to Yogācāra philosophy of mind. One of the most common and fundamental themes in Buddhist intellectual discourses is the denial of self (anātman). Throughout history, Buddhist thinkers have attempted to account for subjectivity, while rejecting self as the basis for perhaps the most intrinsic and ineradicable feature of our existence. The Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntikas maintain the reductionist approach to self and explain our sense of self through the function of the mental factor, the view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi). However, under this Abhidharmic model subjectivity is at best episodic and sporadic. The Yogācāra thinkers then proposed the theory of the afflicted mentation (kliṣṭaṁ manas) which constantly ruminates and is responsible for the sense of self. This paper investigates the transition from the Abhidharma to the Yogācāra model and the intellectual context in which this transition emerged.

Sthiramati is a prominent commentator of the Yogācāra tradition, however his contributions to tackling key issues in Buddhist philosophy are often overlooked in scholarship. In his commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā, the Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya, Sthiramati claims that one of the purposes of Vasubandhu’s work is to reject the ‘extreme doctrine’ of the Ābhidharmikas that “just like consciousness, the object of consciousness also substantially (dravyatas) exists”. Although Sthiramati sides with the Ābhidharmikas (over the Mādhyamikas) in accepting that consciousness substantially exists, he denies the same status to the objects of consciousness. This talk investigates Sthiramati’s attempt to adhere to fundamental Abhidharmic presuppositions in philosophy of mind and perception while criticizing and reinterpreting the Ābhidharmikas’ view that the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) of consciousness is a mind-independent entity. With regard to his critique, I pay special attention to how Sthiramati combines various metaphysical and epistemological considerations used for a similar purpose in Vasubandhu’s and Dignāga’s works.