Fundamental (dis)agreement: Sthiramati on the Abhidharmic view of the nature and objects of consciousness

Sthiramati is a prominent commentator of the Yogācāra tradition, however his contributions to tackling key issues in Buddhist philosophy are often overlooked in scholarship. In his commentary on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā, the Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya, Sthiramati claims that one of the purposes of Vasubandhu’s work is to reject the ‘extreme doctrine’ of the Ābhidharmikas that “just like consciousness, the object of consciousness also substantially (dravyatas) exists”. Although Sthiramati sides with the Ābhidharmikas (over the Mādhyamikas) in accepting that consciousness substantially exists, he denies the same status to the objects of consciousness. This talk investigates Sthiramati’s attempt to adhere to fundamental Abhidharmic presuppositions in philosophy of mind and perception while criticizing and reinterpreting the Ābhidharmikas’ view that the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) of consciousness is a mind-independent entity. With regard to his critique, I pay special attention to how Sthiramati combines various metaphysical and epistemological considerations used for a similar purpose in Vasubandhu’s and Dignāga’s works.