Does Cognition Illumine Itself?

It is a central claim of Yogācāra philosophy, defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, that a cognition must apprehend itself in order to apprehend an object. Some believe this idea – known as the “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) doctrine – also to be central to certain European philosophical traditions (German idealism, Husserlian phenomenology). Building on previous work by Birgit Kellner and Alex Watson, this talk analyzes a key passage from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda chapter (vv. 179cd ff.), that critiques Dignāga’s so-called memory argument for this thesis – namely, that when one remembers something, one also remembers experiencing it. The passage reveals the complexity and sophistication of a Hindu-Buddhist controversy already at an early stage.