The Mīmāṃsā author Kumārila was one of the most formidable and determined critics of the Yogācāra philosophy and of the tradition of Buddhist epistemology that emerged within it. This session explores several aspects of his biting and brilliant critique and discusses what we can learn from it, both for our understanding of South Asian intellectual history and for philosophy today. Key topics to be discussed include the Buddhist concept of conventional truth, idealism, the dream argument, the "self-awareness" (svasaṃvedana) doctrine of Yogācāra and the memory argument for it, and whether an anti-realist, non-referential view of language can be internally consistent.
In vv. 3 - 83 of the Nirālambanavāda chapter of the Commentary in Verses (Ślokavārttika), Kumārila mounts a powerful critique of Yogācāra in the form of a response to the dream argument. This critique engages at the level of both metaphysics and philosophy of language. Kumārila argues that a Yogācārin who denies that our concepts have external percepts, based on the analogy of a dream, can make sense neither of goal-oriented motivation nor of perceptual error. And he turns the dream argument against itself, deftly arguing that its rejection of referential views of language deprives the proponent of the argument of the ability to understand either the argument itself or any aspect of Sanskrit debate. Since participants in South Asian debates were held accountable for representing each other’s arguments accurately, Kumārila’s account of Yogācāra may shed light on scholarly conversations about how to interpret the meaning of key Yogācāra teachings.
In a brief exchange with his Buddhist opponent in the Nirālambanavāda (vv. 154-59), Kumārila argues that (non-referring) expressions like “the horn of a hare” cannot bring about correct ideas. His commentator, Uṃveka, understands this as having implications for the Buddhist conception of upāya, skillful means, and of saṃvṛtisat, conventional reality. Keating's paper unpacks Kumārila’s reasoning and considers its implications for both Buddhist opponents and the Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic project, which relies on arthavāda, motivating speech, that some have characterized as convenient fictions.
This paper explores how defenders of Yogācāra might be able to respond to Kumārila’s critique by drawing on later developments in Buddhist philosophy and contemporary developments in technology. Examples of computer simulations, especially multiplayer games, show that environments in which everything that appears is an illusion can be characterized by both misperception and goal-oriented motivation, so long as they also exhibit intersubjectively robust causal regularities. Meanwhile, the spectacular self-destruction of the dream argument shows that a Yogācārin cannot afford to characterize conventional truth as false simpliciter. In this dialectical context, a key role could be played by the later distinction drawn by Buddhist epistemologists between a cognition’s being non-mistaken (abhrānta) and the distinct property of being non-deceptive (avisaṃvādaka).
It is a central claim of Yogācāra philosophy, defended by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, that a cognition must apprehend itself in order to apprehend an object. Some believe this idea – known as the “self-awareness” (svasaṃvedana) doctrine – also to be central to certain European philosophical traditions (German idealism, Husserlian phenomenology). Building on previous work by Birgit Kellner and Alex Watson, this talk analyzes a key passage from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda chapter (vv. 179cd ff.), that critiques Dignāga’s so-called memory argument for this thesis – namely, that when one remembers something, one also remembers experiencing it. The passage reveals the complexity and sophistication of a Hindu-Buddhist controversy already at an early stage.