Computer Simulations and Conventional Truth: Responding to Kumārila's Double Critique

This paper explores how defenders of Yogācāra might be able to respond to Kumārila’s critique by drawing on later developments in Buddhist philosophy and contemporary developments in technology. Examples of computer simulations, especially multiplayer games, show that environments in which everything that appears is an illusion can be characterized by both misperception and goal-oriented motivation, so long as they also exhibit intersubjectively robust causal regularities. Meanwhile, the spectacular self-destruction of the dream argument shows that a Yogācārin cannot afford to characterize conventional truth as false simpliciter. In this dialectical context, a key role could be played by the later distinction drawn by Buddhist epistemologists between a cognition’s being non-mistaken (abhrānta) and the distinct property of being non-deceptive (avisaṃvādaka).