Theism rose to new prominence among Hindu philosophers of the second millennium, and this in turn gave rise to new, creative approaches to problems in philosophical theology. This session will consider three such problems. The first paper considers what it means for God to have a body, focusing on Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita responses to Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā critiques of the idea that God possesses a material body. The second paper discusses Vedāntadeśika’s approach to a problem in soteriology: if God is all-powerful, why does he not directly free souls trapped in saṃsāra? The third paper focuses on the problem of infinite regress, asking whether Vedāntins might be able to accept certain versions of the Cosmological Argument in spite of their commitment to the notion of beginningless karma.
Positions ranging from God’s non-existence to God’s possessing a human-like body have been countenanced within Hindu philosophical discussions concerning God’s nature. I engage specifically with arguments deployed for and against God’s possessing a bodily form to highlight an ambiguity inherent in the discussion. Whereas the body of God posited by Vedānta schools, including Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, comprises a divine substance, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā argue against a God that possesses a material body. The conclusion of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā arguments in question is, in other words, wholeheartedly affirmed by Vedānta schools from the very onset. The paper first substantiates that this is, in fact, an ambiguity that is non-trivial and needs redressing, and then motivates the hypothesis that the target of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā argumentation is not Vedānta but early Sāmkhya as typified in the Yuktidīpikā commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā.
Due to the Vedāntic commitment to beginningless (anādi) karman, which seemingly entails an infinite regress, it is unclear whether or Vedāntic theism is compatible with Cosmological Arguments, which attempt to rule out the possibility of such regresses. In this paper, I closely examine the concept of anādi-karman and highlight three possible interpretations of this doctrine. I argue that two of these interpretations are indeed compatible with certain formulations of the Kalām Cosmological Argument. I also argue that the Leibnizian Cosmological Argument (LCA) may be compatible with all three interpretations, as the LCA does not rule out an infinite regress per se, but only an infinite regress that is lacks a deeper explanation in terms of a necessary being. These conclusions, if correct, can bring Vedānta in closer dialogue with contemporary philosophy of religion and thus enrich this discipline.
We plan to host this 90-minute session, a 2-hour roundtable, and a co-sponsored session with the Indian and Chinese Religions in Dialogue Unit.