Embodied Cognition of Value

In this paper, I argue that embodied cognition helps to undermine the Humean dualism of facts and values. I draw on two contributions to embodied cognition, the concept of affordances (originally developed by Gibson) and the enactive approach (originally developed by Varela, Thompson and Rosch). Gibson argued that the perceiving animal would typically be engaged in some goal-directed activity, and he speaks in this context of the animal’s perception of “affordances,” i.e., value-laden opportunities in their environment. The enactive approach treats cognition as a dynamic system that arises from the interactions between an animal and its environment. Together, these two concepts open the door to a realist account of values. Insofar as religious practices are regimens for training participants in the perception of affordances, we can underaind them as helping people move from novice to competent to expert at recognizing real good and bad in the world.