This paper argues that the Buddha’s purported omniscience through direct perception is a phenomenological shift in his experience, which is difficult to account for based on the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika conception of omniscience (sarvajña), and two of their accepted means of knowledge (pramāṇas): perception and inference.
First, the paper discusses the scope of the Buddha’s omniscience in Abhidharma Buddhism. Second, it discusses the path toward omniscience according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika school. Third, it briefly summarizes the Sarvāstivādin theory of perception, showing that the Buddha cannot be omniscient through perception under the Sarvāstivāda model due to their metaphysical commitments. Following this, the paper considers whether the Buddha can be omniscient through inference and show that inference does not rescue the Sarvāstivādin view of omniscience by appealing to both Vasubandhu and Dhammapāla. Last, it posits that the Buddha’s omniscience is a phenomenological shift in his experience due to prajñā and not fully comprehensible through pramāṇa theory.