A Tibetan Buddhist Perspective on Kierkegaard’s Truth and Existence

This paper is a philosophical examination of Kierkegaard’s approach to truth and existence in relation to Tibetan Buddhist thought represented by Je Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). A problem that seems to surface for the close reader with some familiarity with both thinkers is whether Kierkegaard’s truth as subjectivity is similar to truth as non-duality in Tibetan Buddhism as lacking a subject and object distinction between the knower and what is to know (the referent). Adopting a comparative method based on the Conceptual Metaphor Theory in cognitive linguistics, my study embraces an investigation that is in effect an argument favoring a similarity between truth as subjectivity and truth as non-duality. This research implies that Tibetan Buddhism offers the resources for our contemporary inquiry into the relevant issue in Kierkegaard’s thought. It contributes to work in inter-religious dialogue and comparative theology, deepening the dialogue between the two faith traditions or cultures.