Derrida, Levinas, and Economic Violence

In this paper, I argue for a reading of “Force of Law” that positions it as both a continued engagement with Levinas’s conceptions of violence – in ways both affirming and critical – and as a corrective to some of Derrida’s own earlier thinking on violence. To make this case, I first trace Levinas’s views on non-violence as he sketches them in Totality and Infinity and Difficult Freedom and discuss Derrida’s critical response to these formulations and their role in Levinas’s broader ethical scheme. I will then explicate Levinas’ treatment of violence and non-violence in Otherwise Than Being as a response to Derrida’s critique and argue that his justification of the concept of non-violence is ultimately insufficient in the context of his ethical system. In light of this, I argue that it is all the more significant that in “Force of Law”, Derrida will forcefully trouble the notion of a justified violence.